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The term diaphaneity is used in philosophy, phenomenology, and the study of perception in a meaning contrasted with transparency.
See the following quotes from Zięba, Paweł Jakub (2021 December 2) “Selectionism and Diaphaneity”, in Axiomathes, Springer, →DOI, →ISSN:
diaphaneity is not equivalent to transparency. Consider two distinctions: metaphysical vs. phenomenological transparency (Gow 2016), and strong vs. weak transparency (Kind 2003). In the sense relevant to this paper, diaphaneity entails (but is not entailed by) metaphysical transparency (i.e. the claim that in having a perceptual experience one is only aware of the perceived items), and supports (but does not entail) phenomenological transparency (i.e. the claim that introspection of perceptual experience does not seem to reveal anything over and above the perceived items). On the other hand, diaphaneity understood as a corollary of primitivist-relationalist formulation of selectionism is antithetical to both strong transparency (i.e. the claim that it is impossible to attend directly to one’s experience) and weak transparency (i.e. the claim that attending directly to one’s experience is possible albeit difficult). This is because relationalism entails that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is literally constituted by the perceived items, which means that attending to the perceived items amounts to attending to the experience itself.
the history of diaphaneity, discussed at length by many philosophers (see e.g. Martin 1998, 2015; Stoljar 2004; Stoneham 2008; Van Cleve 2015; French 2018), is usually traced back to G.E. Moore (1922).
