Citations:Outer Manchuria

English citations of Outer Manchuria

Outer Manchuria in Russia

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(Closely associated with the specific territories ceded in 1858 and 1860 by China to Russia)

• [1996, Juha Janhunen, “Introduction: The Manchurian ethnohistorical region”, in Manchuria: An Ethnic History (Ethnic Studies of Northeast Asia)‎^[1], volume 222, Helsinki: Finno-Ugrian Society, →ISBN, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 6:

  […] exception of the Sungari outlet, the potential range of human movements from Central Manchuria towards the subregions of Western, Northern and Eastern Manchuria is hindered by extensive, though not insurmountable, physical obstacles. The passage towards the south is somewhat less restricted, allowing, for certain purposes, the two subregions of Southern and Central Manchuria to be viewed as a single complex which may be termed Inner Manchuria,⁸ as opposed to the periphery or Outer Manchuria.
  Another important orographical feature is the Sikhote Alin (Sixoteh-Alin’) Range, which runs a distance of 700 miles (1,100 kms) between the Ussuri and Lower Amur basins, on the one hand, and the […]

  (Note: This work seems to be the first unambiguous inclusion of areas in Russia as part of an 'Outer Manchuria'. However, it is a unique, scholastic use of the term 'Outer Manchuria': Janhunen's 'Outer Manchuria' includes areas in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, areas south of the Amur River, big parts of eastern Heilongjiang Province, and all of Lake Khanka, in addition to areas in Russia. (map, p.2) Note also that her 'Outer Manchuria' concept does not include Sakhalin, part of her 'Insular Manchuria', which includes Japan. (p.227) Janhunen's work is extremely erudite and includes other seemingly unique terminology.)]

• 2004 May 10, 62.6.139.11, “Outer Manchuria”, in English Wikipedia‎^[2], archived from the original on 2023-05-02‎^[3]:

  It was ceded by the Manchu Empire to Russia in two stages and from 1860 to 1920 was, as Russian Manchuria, part of the Russian Empire. From 1920 to 1925 Outer Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese and briefly united with Inner Manchuria under Japanese domination. […] In 1959 tension arose between Chinese Inner Manchuria and Russian Outer Manchuria over the interpretation of the treaties of Aigun and Peking. This was as much an attempt to undo European colonialism as an ideological split between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchov.

• 2006 [2006 February 1], “Dr Christopher Hughes and Professor David Wall”, in East Asia: Seventh Report of Session 2005-06‎^[4], volume II, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, page Ev 9-Ev 10, Ev 11:

  Q35 Mr Horam: What area are we talking about where the pipelines have to go through?
  Professor Wall: What we used to call Outer Manchuria; the provinces around Manchuria which go down to Vladivostok—those areas—and Sakhalin Island, from where oil and gas is still coming. […] The newspapers are full of references to the "yellow peril"; there is a strong anti-Chiense sentiment at that level; they are worried about them coming and, in the North East, at least, this hundred years of humilitation thing is still very strong—that Outer Manchuria is Chinese and should be given back.

  (Note: Ev 1 says "Professor David Wall, Centre of Chinese Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, and Chatham House." See also: David Wall Obituary, RES Newsletter, January 2008, no. 140.)

• 2009, Christopher Meyer, Getting Our Way: 500 Years of Adventure and Intrigue: The Inside Story of British Diplomacy‎^[5], London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, page 181:

  In particular, Elliot found himself confronted by a redoubtable opponent in Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatyev, the Russian Ambassador to the Sublime Porte. Ignatyev was cunning, agile and bold. He had had adventures aplenty and narrow escapes in Central Asia, where he had sought to build Russian influence. A particularly nimble piece of diplomacy had led to his acquiring Outer Manchuria from the Chinese Emperor.

• 2010, John Vaillant, “Markov”, in The Tiger: A True Story of Vengeance and Survival‎^[6] (Adventure/Nature), →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 59:

  Two years later, Czar Alexander II went a step further and coerced the Chinese into signing the Treaty of Peking, thereby adding another slice of Outer Manchuria—what is now Primorye and southern Khabarovsk Territory—to the Russian empire. In the mid-1960s, it seemed as if Mao might try to get them back.

• 2010, William A. Callahan, “Where Is China?: The Cartography of National Humiliation”, in China: The Pessoptimist Nation‎^[7], Oxford University Press, published 2012, →ISBN, →OCLC, pages 113, 240:

  Other critiques of the Sino—Russian border continue to percolate among China’s netizens, including items on the PRC’s premier search engine Baidu, which rename the Russian Far East as “Outer Manchuria.” This Web site marks Outer Manchuria as an area of lost territory on a national humiliation-style map, and the text explains that it has been China’s sovereign territory “since ancient times,” and was lost when it “was invaded and occupied by Czarist Russia.”⁵⁴

  54. In Chinese the area is usually called Outer Northeast (wai dongbei) and in English, Outer Manchuria. But the Web site makes clear that they are both referring to the same lost territory. (http://baike.baidu.com/view/173829.htm; accessed March 10, 2008). Also see the Chinese Wikipedia site, which is even more detailed and has a colored map that marks lost territories in red. (http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A4%96%E6%9D%B1%E5%8C%97; accessed March 10, 2008).

• 2011, Henry Kissinger, “From Preeminence to Decline”, in On China‎^[8], New York: Penguin Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 68:

  For these services Moscow exacted a staggering territorial price: a broad swath of territory in so-called Outer Manchuria along the Pacific coast, including the port city now called Vladivostok.¹⁴ In a stroke, Russia had gained a major new naval base, a foothold in the Sea of Japan, and 350,000 square miles of territory once considered Chinese.

• 2011, Frank Senauth, “The History of Japan”, in Earthquake-Tsunami-Disaster in Japan 2011‎^[9], AuthorHouse, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page xx-xxi:

  Russian pressure fom the north appeared again after Muraviev had gained Outer Manchuria at Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). This led to heavy Russian pressure on Sakhalin which the Japanese eventually yielded in exchange for the Kuril islands (1875).

• 2012 February 21, Frank Jacobs, “Manchurian Trivia”, in The New York Times‎^[10], →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 2022-07-29, Opinion Pages‎^[11]:

  Russian settlers took possession of the fringes of the Chinese world, de facto annexations that were ratified by a series of “unequal treaties” [8], the Treaty of Aigun of 1858 and the Russo-Chinese Convention of Peking of 1860, which established the easternmost part of the present-day border between China and Russia [9].

  [9] Establishing what is now known as Russia’s Far East but is still referred to by some in China as Outer Manchuria. Basically, the Russian territory south of the Stanovoy Mountains, a 500-mile-long range that forms the watershed between the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and that until 1858 constituted the border between Russia and China.

• 2012 September 22, Frank Jacobs, Parag Khanna, “The New World”, in The New York Times‎^[12], →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 2020-11-11, page 10‎^[13]:

  China Gobbles Up Siberia
  Russia’s greatest geopolitical fear is fed by a very plausible scenario — China, populous and resource-hungry, taking over large chunks of Siberia, part of Russia’s failing and emptying East. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese have already crossed the border at the Amur River and set up trading settlements, intermarrying with Russians and Siberia’s native nomadic minorities. Russia has a nuclear arsenal with which to fend off formal threats to its sovereignty, but the demographic imbalance is to Russia’s disadvantage and could accelerate the economic shift in China’s favor. Russia’s far eastern outpost of Vladivostok is ever more distant from Moscow. Will it become a Russian enclave in a re-Sinofied “Outer Manchuria,” like Kaliningrad, 5,000 miles away on the Baltic Sea, a Soviet fragment stranded inside the European Union?

• 2012 September 30, Parag Khanna, “The new Silk Road is made of iron—and stretches from Scotland to Singapore”, in Quartz‎^[14], archived from the original on 02 May 2023:

  Before Britain ruled its empire on which the sun never set, Russia had become the largest contiguous territorial power since the Mongols, stretching from Eastern Europe to North America (Alaska) by 1866. Railway expansion enabled Tsar Alexander II to invade outer Manchuria in 1868, and leverage Central Asia and Siberia for supplying Russia’s World War I efforts.

• 2013 March 21, “Ahead of Xi's visit, China web users deluge Russia blog with insults”, in NDTV, Agence France-Presse‎^[15], archived from the original on 2015-11-07‎^[16]:

  Others pointed to old territorial disputes - a large area of far eastern Russia was once Chinese, but ceded to the Russian Empire by the Treaty of Peking in the mid-19th century, and there were military clashes in 1969 over a border island.
  Officially the rows have been settled, but one poster said: "Return Outer Manchuria! Take back that party!"

• 2013 August 23, Taylor Washburn, “Between Russia and China, a Demographic Time Bomb”, in The National Interest‎^[17], archived from the original on 23 August 2013‎^[18]:

  Two “unequal treaties” in 1858 and 1860 gave Russia more land than it had conceded to the Manchus two hundred years earlier, including the vast region then called Outer Manchuria. The southern part of this concession would become Russia’s maritime province, Primorsky Krai, where the city of Vladivostok (“Ruler of the East”) was chartered in 1880.

• 2014, David Eimer, “The Arctic Borderlands”, in The Emperor Far Away: Travels at the Edge of China‎^[19], Bloomsbury USA, →ISBN, →OCLC, →OL, page 279:

  In 1858, the Treaty of Aigun formalised the division of Manchuria. Everything north of what the Russians call the Amur River and the Chinese the Heilongjiang, or Black Dragon River, was assigned to Russia. Two years later, more Manchu lands went north under the Treaty of Peking. In all, Russia acquired a million square kilometres of Outer Manchuria. It is a massive area. Stretching from the present Sino-Russian border to the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, it includes what are now the major cities of the Russian Far East — Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk — yet the tsar’s army barely had to fire a shot to attain it.

• 2015, James MacDonald, “The First Era of Globalization”, in When Globalization Fails: The Rise and Fall of Pax Americana‎^[20], Farrar, Straus and Giroux, →ISBN, →OCLC, page 48:

  In the north, however, the Russians and Japanese had other ideas and looked to lop bits off the old empire that they could control in a more formal way. Russia gained Outer Manchuria in the 1860s, and in 1895 Japan gained Taiwan.
  What happened next confirmed the worst fears of those who believed that imperialism must lead to war. In 1905, the two rivals went to war over Inner Manchuria, which Russia considered vital because it gave it access to a warm-water port on the Pacific,* and to which Japan felt entitled after its victory in 1895, even if it had been forced to return the Chinese cession of the area in the face of the opposition of the Western powers.

  * In 1860, Russia took over much of Outer Manchuria from China and established Vladivostok as its first port on the Pacific. However, Vladivostok was icebound for several months during the winter, and in 1897, Russia forced China to grant it control of the strategically placed Port Arthur (now in the Chinese city of Dalian) in southern Manchuria, over strong Japanese objections.

• 2015, Dominic Ziegler, Black Dragon River: A Journey Down the Amur River at the Borderlands of Empires‎^[21], New York: Penguin Press, →ISBN, →OCLC, pages 8, 165, 228, 243, 333:

  In this context the vast lands north of the Amur River and east of its great tributary, the Ussuri, come into focus, lands once known as “Outer Manchuria” or “Outer Tartary.” What will become of them? Russia seized these lands at a time when Western imperial powers were carving up a stricken China among themselves—“like a melon,” as Chinese pointed out at the time. […]
  The Russians would keep Nerchinsk. But they would cede territory east of that, including the entire Amur basin. In other words, not just Manchuria, the lands south of the great Amur loop, were acknowledged as Chinese, but an enormous chunk of the northern Amur watershed, a region which Europeans came to call Outer Tartary or, sometimes, Outer Manchuria. Under the treaty, the czar undertook to pull out all the Cossack adventurers who had pressed into these lands. […]
  The first consequence of the Manchus’ expulsion of the Russians from their Amur Eden in the late 1600s was to deflect the fur trade northward, over the top of the territories—Outer Tartary or Outer Manchuria, another name Europeans used—that China had made so clear belonged to it only. […]
  Later, treaties formalized Russia’s theft. The Treaty of Aigun in 1858 gave the Russians control of the Amur’s left bank, all 2,760 miles of it, and all the land north, what used to be called Outer Manchuria. Two years later, at the Peking Convention, the Chinese surrendered the Amur’s right bank, starting from where the Ussuri joins the main stream. That gave the Russians what evocatively used to be called “Eastern Tartary”: the whole of the wild, ginseng-bearing Sikhote-Alin range right down to the Sea of Japan. To this region, the Russians gave the name Primorye: “by the sea.” Today it is known as Primorsky Krai, Russia’s Maritime Province. […]
  There is an almost litanical quality to the way Chinese rhetoric rehearses the territorial grievances over Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands, which Japan calls the Senkakus. Yet the far larger lands that Muraviev grabbed north of the Amur in 1858, the lands that were once known as Outer Manchuria or Outer Tartary, are rarely mentioned, if at all. Russia appears to have been forgiven and the lands forgotten.

• 2015 July 15, Lilia Shevtsova, “Bad Romance”, in Brookings Institution‎^[22], archived from the original on 2018-11-28, Op-Ed‎^[23]:

  For starters, China still nurses historical grievances toward Russia. Why should China stoop to buy commodities from its own Outer Manchuria, which was only ceded to Russia in the 19th century as a result of a series of humiliating treaties that Russia imposed on China? Are the Chinese really that forgiving? Henry Kissinger doesn’t think so: “Chinese leaders had not forgotten the series of ‘unequal treaties’ extorted for a century to establish the Russian possession of its Far East maritime provinces. . . ”(On China, Penguin Books, 2011, pp. 98–9). […]
  Meanwhile, there are a lot of signs pointing to the fragility of the Kremlin’s “we are friends with China” construct. In June 2015 news spread that Russia’s Zabaikalski region (part of the old Chinese Outer Manchuria) promised to grant about 300,000 hectares of land to the Chinese company Huae Xinban under a 49-year lease for mere peanuts—less than $5 a hectare. Simultaneously, a draft law has been submitted to the Russian State Duma to guarantee the Chinese sovereignty over the rented territory; the same Kremlin that is so desperately defending Russian sovereignty from the malicious West is selling it for peanuts to China.

• 2017, Julia C. Schneider, “The New Setting: Political Thinking after 1912”, in Nation and Ethnicity: Chinese Discourses on History,‎^[24], →ISBN, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 277:

  In the mid-19th century, the Qing government gave over (so-called) Outer Manchuria, where mostly non-Manchu Tungusic people dwelled, to the Russian Empire by the Treaty of Aigun (Aigun tiaoyue, 1858) and the (First) Convention of Peking (Beijing tiaoyue, 1860). […] The Convention of Peking, one of several unequal treaties, moreover assigned the parts in the East of the Ussuri River (Wusulijiang) to Russia. Outer Manchuria, also called Russian Manchuria was never claimed to be part of a Chinese nation-state. Today it belongs to the Russian Federation, is no longer referred to as Outer Manchuria, and is considered to be part of Siberia. Consquently, the name Manchuria refers only to Inner Manchuria today. In the following, I will refer to Inner Manchuria as Manchuria.

• 2018, “Progress and Empire 1850-1914”, in History of the World: Map by Map‎^[25], 1st American edition, DK, →ISBN, →OCLC, page 246:

  From 1858, a weakening Qing Empire ceded Outer Manchuria to Russia—an area from which it had previously been excluded by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). Russia founded Vladivostok, a relatively ice-free port and, in 1898, leased the Liaodong Peninsula from China, gaining the warm-water port of Port Arthur. Alarmed by Japan’s growing interest in China, Russia occupied southern Manchuria but was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and abandoned its imperial ambitions in the area.

• 2019 February, Angela E. Stent, Putin's World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest‎^[26], →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page [27]:

  After praising the border agreement, Deng led the Soviet foreign minister into a room where a map of China lay on the table. The map showed Outer Manchuria, which forms the Russian Primorsky Krai province, as Chinese, not Russian, territory.

• 2022, Janusz Bugajski, “Neighborhood Impact”, in Failed State: A Guide to Russia’s Rupture‎^[28], Jamestown Foundation, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 397:

  The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, signed by Russia and China in 2001, failed to fully resolve the outstanding border contests. For instance, when Moscow celebrated the 160-year anniversary of the founding of Vladivostok in 2020, the state-owned China Global Television Network asserted that Vladivostok unjustly replaced the Chinese city of Haishenwai in the “unequal Treaty of Beijing” of 1860. Under immense international pressure, China’s northeastern territories of Outer Manchuria were awarded to the Russian Empire and now form Primorski Krai and a substantial part of Khabarovsk Krai.

• 2022 July 12, Jan Kallberg, “Goodbye Vladivostok, Hello Hǎishēnwǎi!”, in Center for European Policy Analysis‎^[29], Washington, DC, archived from the original on 2022-11-17, Europe's Edge‎^[30]:

  In 1997, the First Opium War officially ended with the British administration and forces leaving Hong Kong. The Second Opium War is still ongoing, since the Russian Federation continues to occupy the Amur region and Outer Manchuria. This land area was extorted from China in 1860 during the Second Opium War, under threat to set Beijing ablaze.
  Surely no one these days thinks of returning Vladivostok to China?

• 2023 April 12, John Bolton, “A New American Grand Strategy to Counter Russia and China”, in The Wall Street Journal‎^[31], →ISSN, →OCLC, archived from the original on 29 April 2023, Opinion:

  Third, after Ukraine wins its war with Russia, we must aim to split the Russia-China axis. Moscow’s defeat could unseat Mr. Putin’s regime. What comes next is a government of unknowable composition. New Russian leaders may or may not look to the West rather than Beijing, and might be so weak that the Russian Federation’s fragmentation, especially east of the Urals, isn’t inconceivable. Beijing is undoubtedly eyeing this vast territory, which potentially contains incalculable mineral wealth. Significant portions of this region were under Chinese sovereignty until the 1860 Treaty of Peking transferred “outer Manchuria,” including extensive Pacific coast lands, to Moscow. Russia’s uncontrolled dissolution could provide China direct access to the Arctic, including even the Bering Strait, facing Alaska.

• 2023 April 20, Alexander Etkind, “Putin Is Opening A Door For China”, in Noema Magazine‎^[32], archived from the original on 2023-04-20, Geopolitics & Globalization‎^[33]:

  China did eventually regain Harbin and, much later in 1997, Hong Kong. However, big parts of Manchuria, which China lost along with Hong Kong, still belong to Russia. Outer Manchuria, as the Russia-controlled region is known, has great strategic value, abundant natural resources and game-changing potential. Important cities and military harbors were built on these lands. But in Russian hands, this gigantic area of almost 400,000 square miles — roughly equivalent to a tenth of China — remains underpopulated and underdeveloped.
  In 2016, shortly after the annexation of Crimea, the Russian government issued a law that encouraged settlement in the Far East, including Outer Manchuria, promising each adventurous migrant a hectare (0.4 acres) for free.

outer Manchuria (remote region)

(Literal use of 'outer' to refer to regions of or near Manchuria understood by the author as remote or distant in some way)

• 1862, Lindesay Brine, “Preface”, in The Taeping Rebellion in China‎^[34], John Murray, →OCLC, page x; republished as “Church Missionary Work in the Chekeang Province”, in The Church Missionary Intelligencer‎^[35], 1866 November, page 340, column 1:

  The Chinese are peculiarly averse to leaving their own country, and it is not on account of the prospect of higher wages that they do so, but because their native districts are over-populated. This has been exemplified of late by the sudden overflow of the inhabitants of the northern provinces into outer Manchuria: also inquiries made into the relative wages received by them at home and abroad led to a similar conclusion.

• 1917 December 30, “Japanese Activity in Shantung. Confidential Report asked for by Dr. Brown, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City.”, in Papers Relating to Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs Prepared for the Use of the American Delegation to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, 1921-1922‎^[36], Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, published 1922, →OCLC, page 231:

  The Province is full of Japanese spies—surveyors, mine experts, military engineers, etc., just as in outer Manchuria, Mongolia, Fukien, and other centres. These agents in many instances secretly, but also in many instances openly, ply their trade and do as they please on the soil of a neutral people to their detriment.

• 1918, M. W. von Bernewitz, “Gold and Silver”, in The Mineral Industry: Its Statistics, Technology and Trade‎^[37], volume XXVI, London: Hill Publishing Company, →OCLC, page 252:

  ASIA
  China.—Conditions in this country were far from favorable for expansion of mining during 1917, and little of value is available. The mineral resources of China were reviewed by V. K. Ting.¹ Gold deposits may be divided into four classes, namely: (1) recent alluvium, (2) ancient alluvium, (3) Tertiary sandstone, and (4) quartz veins in pre-Cambrian gneiss and metamorphic rocks. The first is the most important […] In a small way the gold-bearing gneiss and phyllite are worked in Szechuan, Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien, north Chihli, and Shantung. The Maha mine in Szechuan and the Ping-Kiang mine in Hunan occur in this class. Placer ground in Manchuria averages 1.07 dwt. gold per ton. Veins carrying under 6 dwt. are not considered profitable. Gold production of Manchuria in 1915 was 120,000 oz., and 60,000 oz. from outer Manchuria, the other provinces mentioned yielding 20,000 oz. in all.

• 1927 May, Quincy Wright, “Bolshevist Influences in China”, in Current History‎^[38], volume XXVI, number 2, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 302, column 2:

  Moscow doubtless wants to make trouble for the Western Powers so far as she can without losing their recognition or encouraging actual hostility. She wants peace and trade and an opportunity for internal economic reconstruction above everything just now. It seems doubtful whether she expects to Bolshevize China, though she wants China fully independent of Western imperialism and friendly to her. She doubtless hopes to retain her interests in outer Mongolia and outer Manchuria as the price of assistance to the Nationalists.

• 1929 December 16, “Sino-Russian Crisis Reasons are Cited”, in The Washington Post‎^[39], →ISSN, →OCLC, page 4, column 4:

  Three underlying reasons for the present Russian-Chinese crisis, the rule of outer Manchuria, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the Communist problem—were explained yesterday afternoon at the Washington Open Forum by Dr. Kiang Kang Hu, leader of the Socialist Democratic party in China before its dissolution.
  The speaker, who negotiated with Trotsky and Lenin on behalf of the Chinese government, declared that the fundamental reason for the present disturbance lies in Manchuria. During the regime of the late President Sun Yat Sen, Dr. Hu went to Moscow as an individual in an attempt to adjust the disturbance.
  His proposition for the alleviation of the strained relations was rejected by each country. It was his proposal that Manchuria be granted automony, that it be used as a buffer state between the two countries, and that the 80,000 Chinese soldiers then in the Red army be transferred as the army of Manchuria after the establishment of automony.
  His proposal was rejected by the Russians, he said, and own people, who feared that he was attempting to aggrandize himself and assume the dictatorship of the Manchuria. When Russia offered assistance to Sun Yat Sen, he said, he cautioned the head of the Nationalist party against accepting them, fearing that it would be an opening wedge for the propagation of Soviet principles in China.

• [1936, Proceedings - United States Naval Institute‎^[40], volume 62, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 109, column 2:

  Meantime Japan has consistently pushed beyond Manchukuo for control of Inner Manchuria^{[sic – meaning Mongolia]} and the adjacent Chinese province of Chahar. As a result of clashes on the Chahar-Jehol border in January, […]
  […] Manchukuo, but, to quote a recent Foreign Policy Report (November 20, 1935), they would "probably elect submission to Japan rather than fight to the death for China." Japan is also pressing for a foothold in Outer Manchuria^{[sic – meaning Mongolia]}, but, in the opinion of the Report already quoted, the inhabitants there would infinitely prefer the mild tutelage and virtual independence they have enjoyed under Russian guidance to the strict control to which the […]]

• 1941 July 31, “Japs War Weary, But Can't Let Go, Say Observers”, in Chicago Daily Tribune‎^[41], volume C, number 182, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 7, column 3:

  In the north the situation is no brighter. There are now two Red armies operating in Outer Manchuria and Mongolia. These total 26 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, and four mechanized divisions. Within the last few weeks the Russians are believed to have withdrawn 10 to 12 divisions from this area.

• 1963 September 24, William R. Kintner, “General Discussion”, in Current Strategic Thinking and Military Theory in the Communist World‎^[42], →OCLC, page 23:

  As you may recall, in 1937 there was a major war between the Japanese and the Soviets on the edges of Outer Manchuria. The two totalitarian powers were able to control a conflict like that and use it as a means of communicating with each other without letting it get out of hand.

• 1979, United States Military Intelligence [1917-1927]: Weekly Summaries‎^[43], page 3631:

  […] with Soviet Russia, and it includes the surrender to the Chinese of 1060 miles of the railroad, 60,000,000 Rubles worth of Chinese Eastern securities, coal mines in Eastern Kirin and at Chapanor, gold mines in the Khailar region and at Toghao in Outer Manchuria, of "special rights" on the Sungari river, and of the forests of Kirin.

• 1986, Joan Elliott Price, Ch'i Wu Shan Chin: A Li-Kuo Revival Piece of the Chin Dynasty‎^[44], →OCLC, page 38:

  […] time the Northern Sung Imperial Painting Academy ceased to function. Hui tsung and approximately 3000 members of his court and family were exiled to outer Manchuria. According to Sung records there were 6,936 paintings at this time in the Imperial Sung collection.

• 1996, Juha Janhunen, “Introduction: The Manchurian ethnohistorical region”, in Manchuria: An Ethnic History (Ethnic Studies of Northeast Asia)‎^[45], volume 222, Helsinki: Finno-Ugrian Society, →ISBN, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 6:

  […] exception of the Sungari outlet, the potential range of human movements from Central Manchuria towards the subregions of Western, Northern and Eastern Manchuria is hindered by extensive, though not insurmountable, physical obstacles. The passage towards the south is somewhat less restricted, allowing, for certain purposes, the two subregions of Southern and Central Manchuria to be viewed as a single complex which may be termed Inner Manchuria,⁸ as opposed to the periphery or Outer Manchuria.
  Another important orographical feature is the Sikhote Alin (Sixoteh-Alin’) Range, which runs a distance of 700 miles (1,100 kms) between the Ussuri and Lower Amur basins, on the one hand, and the […]

• 1996, Juha Janhunen, “The colonial period: From indigenous diversity to alien rule”, in Manchuria: An Ethnic History (Ethnic Studies of Northeast Asia)‎^[46], volume 222, Helsinki: Finno-Ugrian Society, →ISBN, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 39:

  While some more adventurous Chinese colonists became engaged in panning for gold,¹⁰¹ digging wild ginseng (renshen),¹⁰² or trading in deer antlers (panty),¹⁰³ the general impact of Chinese colonization was for a long time slight in the mountains and forests of Outer Manchuria, the traditional habitat of many indigenous nomadic ethnic groups. The general inaccessibility of the Manchurian periphery from China proper led to the origination of the so-called Manchurian Bandits or "Red Beards" (Honghuzi), Chinese-speaking vagabonds, brigands and contrabandists feared by the Russians, Japanese and Chinese alike.¹⁰⁴ The situation changed after the creation of the People's Republic, when even the indigenous ethnic groups following a nomadic mode of life where forced to settle down in villages, initially domianted by local people but increasingly filled with Han Chinese colonists.

• 1998, Working Paper‎^[47], numbers 267-274, →ISSN, →OCLC, page 27:

  Zhang Xinxin was born in 1953 in Nanjing, but not long after her birth, her family moved to Beijing. Like many urban youth of her generation, she was sent to a military farm in the Great Northern Wilderness of outer Manchuria to accept education from farmers and soldiers during the Cultural Revolution in 1969. In 1979, at age twenty-six, she passed the college entrance exam and entered the Central Academy of Drama.

• 2002, “Eastern Styles of Warfare”, in World History of Warfare‎^[48], Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, pages 201–202:

  Among the great Manchu emperors, K’ang-hsi (1662- 1722) stands out as a forceful ruler who defeated internal revolts and engaged in successful campaigns in Outer Manchuria and Tibet, including a 1685 victory over the Russians at the fort of Albazin. This victory was accomplished through an expeditionary force of fifteen thousand, using 150 cannon and 50 mortars provided by the Jesuits.

• 2006, Linda Furiya, “At the Heart of a Black Walnut”, in Bento Box in the Heartland: My Japanese Girlhood in Whitebread America‎^[49], Seal Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, pages 290–291:

  At that time, Russia and Japan had been at odds over the control of Manchuria for decades, beginning with the year-long Russo-Japanese War of 1904, when Russia lost control of Inner and Outer Manchuria to the Japanese.

• 2011, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David A. Welch, “The Cold War”, in Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History‎^[50], 8th edition, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 139:

  East Asia was a fourth issue. The Soviets were neutral in the Pacific until the last week of the war. Then the Soviets declared war, seizing from Japan Outer Manchuria, southern Sakhalin Island, and the entire Kurile Island chain. At Potsdam, the Soviets asked for an occupation zone in Japan, like the American occupation zone in Germany.

• 2016, Marilyn Southard Warshawsky, “Around the World Again”, in John Franklin Goucher: Citizen of the World‎^[51], →ISBN, →OCLC, page 275:

  The Russians had long wanted a warm-water port on the Pacific for military and commercial reasons, and in March 1898, the Chinese gave the Russian Pacific Fleet a twenty-five-year lease on the Liaotung (Liaodong) Peninsula and Port Arthur in outer Manchuria. This decision angered the Japanese because the area had been ceded to Japan by treaty after it won the Sino-Japanese War; that agreement was later rescinded, owing to intervention by Russia and other western powers. […]
  Russia and Japan had both sent troops as part of an international force to quell China’s Boxer Rebellion, but after that, the Russians kept troops along the Korean border in Manchuria, which the Japanese read as a threat. Russians had also crossed into northern Korea, bought land, and established a trading post. Despite negotiations between the rivals to acknowledge Russia’s sphere of influence in outer Manchuria, and Japan’s in Korea, talks broke down early in 1904, and war soon broke out.

Generic Remote Location (like Outer Mongolia or Timbuktu)

• 1945 December 26, “Das Ex-Kapital”, in Punch, or The London Charivari‎^[52], volume CCIX, number 5477 (Satire), →ISSN, →OCLC, page 545, column 1:

  Not that Tackle and I had to slum with the Wardroom Mess. As distinguished emissaries we were fed and lodged by the Chief of Staff himself, whose house, which once belonged to the Ambassador of Outer Manchuria, sets an all-time high in Oriental occidentalism or vice versa. Sinful luxury is a pallid under-description of the Sino-Bavarian bathroom and the T’ang-Nazi lounge, and I am sure that had R.A.F. Intelligence been fully up to its task this pleasure dome could not have remained unbombed, a moral menace to the simple sailors who are forced to live in it.

• 1961, John Selby, chapter 1, in Madame‎^[53], New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 3:

  She was happy to sit beside the manufacturer of beds and bedding, whose passport to this select group matched hers, only more expensively. He had given the Sidney P. Ramsbottom Science Building to Campion; this very minute it was perched on the bluff behind the chapel in all its midwestern Gothic glory. She delighted also in the presence of Chapman Orchard Hanger, the explorer just back from Patagonia, or perhaps it was Manchuria. Outer Manchuria.

• 1968 [1965], Benoîte Groult, Flora Groult, Feminine Plural‎^[54], W. H. Allen, →ISBN, →OCLC, page 128:

  I haven't seen half a dozen Sherpas die, nor crossed Outer Manchuria, nor lost my mittens along with a few fingers, but all the same, today I deserved my summit! A five-hour ascent, a thirty-five-minute descent.

• 1968 June 12, “Raising of Money on the Credit of the Consolidates Revenue Fund”, in Legislature of Ontario Debates‎^[55], number 116, →OCLC, page 4345, column 1:

  I am just telling you, Mr. Speaker, that the Provincial Auditor had to translate terms to me in that those public accounts, we had to make four separate calculations in order to come to that figure. Why? Should the public of Ontario not know if the government of Ontario is going in the red? Does it have to be shrouded by obfuscation? It is almost as if they hired a team of experts from Outer Manchuria to help cloud it in confusion so that you cannot tell.

• 2004, Duncan Harding, “The Fleming Commando”, in Clash in the Baltic‎^[56] (Fiction), Severn House, →ISBN, →OCLC, page 13:

  But by then, Fleming was sufficiently recovered from his ordeal to snarl, ‘I don’t give a fuck, old chap, whether or not they were fired from Outer Manchuria. All I want is that someone attempts to deal with their launching pads toot sweet.’

• 2010 [2009], Andreï Makine, translated by Geoffrey Strachan, The Life of an Unknown Man: A Novel‎^[57], Graywolf Press, →ISBN, →LCCN, →OCLC, page 24:

  "Fine. Give me your manuscript and in an hour I’ll come back with forty copies. You can sign the first one for your Australian neighbor, and he’ll wedge open his skylight with it. You’ve got the wrong period, Ivan! These days the most popular man in France is a footballer, not a poet . . ."
  "In some countries that period survives!"
  "Really? In Outer Manchuria, I suppose."
  "No. In Russia . . ."