The idea of a Eurodeterrent, essentially based on Anglo-French or Franco-German cooperation, has not materialized, for national political reasons. In the meantime the Soviet Union has increased the number of its SS-20 nuclear missiles and of its Backfire bombers, which were excluded from the SALT II agreement as “non-strategic,” but which can, with their respective ranges, easily hit the obsolete French and British nuclear arsenals and the European airports on which the strategic air-forces are based.
Fundamentally, the German rejection was based on the same arguments which were already thoroughly rehearsed when the Germans refused to entertain the idea of the two French Gaullists, Alexandre Sanguinetti and Georges Buis, who proposed in 1979 the creation of a nuclear Eurodeterrent based on Franco-German cooperation which was to have laid the foundations of a new “European Defense Community.”
1987, Steven Philip Kramer, “Socialist Identity, Labour and the SPD: Background to the Security Debate” in the SAIS Review, volume VII, № 2, page 48:
The compromise between these two positions seemed to be a “Eurodeterrent,” an ingenious idea in theory but an unlikely one in practice. But the Liberal rank and file were not ready to grasp at this straw. On 26 January 1987 a new agreement a new agreement was reached between Social Democrats and Liberals on maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent until it could “be negotiated away, as part of a global arms negotiation process.”
1989, Stephen J. Cimbala, Strategic Impasse: Offense, Defense, and Deterrence Theory and Practice, Greenwood Press, →ISBN (10), →ISBN (13), page 245:
Fifth, if the United States is still connected to the Eurostrategic deterrent but not as firmly as in the past, is it connected only for assured destruction missions, or is it also implicit that when called upon, Americans will contribute limited strategic options? The latter would seem to be superfluous under conditions of a very competent European-based nuclear deterrent, whereas the assured destruction mission would have to be performed by Americans in conjunction with Europeans in order to be dissuasive. But if the Americans must still partake of the assured destruction mission, then what have strategic pluralists gained by creating a Eurodeterrent? It might be argued that to break this chain of logic, the U.S.–Soviet START negotiations would drastically reduce superpower inventories and make European and Chinese inventories that much more meaningful.
1993, Frank Ben Tipton, “Historical Perspectives on the Problem of Regional Integration in a United Germany” in the European Studies Journal, volume X: United Germany and Europe: Towards 1990 and Beyond, eds. B. Hüppauf et al., page 65:
He notes, too, that Germany continues to be pulled between Washington and Paris, NATO and the WEU, and speculates about how the possible development of an Anglo-French nuclear force -- a Eurodeterrent -- might affect Germany and "potential [German] dependency feelings."
This innate conservatism also makes most security élites somewhat unenthusiastic about the idea of a European nuclear deterrent – Eurodeterrent – as considered by France.
Concerning the opinion of Spaniards on nuclear weapons, 83 percent were against them in 1995 and 82 percent were also against the “Eurodeterrent”, the idea of having European nuclear arms.
It is not yet clear what position Austria will take when substantive discussions begin on the possibility of a Eurodeterrent within the framework of the CFSP.
1998 December, Neil E. Funtanilla, Nuclear Deterrent Cooperation Involving Britain, France, and Germany, Storming Media, →ISBN (10), →ISBN (13), blurb:
Without a “Eurodeterrent,” an autonomous CFSP for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe’s continued reliance on US nuclear guarantees. However, if an autonomous CFSP were realized, the EU’s combined nuclear posture would have significant implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Due to the complexity of the issues involved in the creation of a multinational European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the creation of a “Eurodeterrent” should be considered the “anchorman” vice the “pacesetter” within the develoment of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
If a group of European nations under EU, WEU or other auspices succeeded in building a collective ‘Eurodeterrent’, some Americans might conclude that US commitments and forces in Europe were no longer necessary.
2002, Simone Wisotzki, Die Nuklearwaffenpolitik Großbritanniens und Frankreichs: Eine konstruktivistische Analyse, Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, →ISBN, § 5.3: “Debatten über Kernwaffen in Großbritannien”, page 214:
Rebecca Johnson sieht fünf Optionen für die Nuklearwaffenpolitik der neuen Labourregierung: 1. Den Verzicht auf Trident und eine potenzielle Nachfolgegeneration; 2. die Option, die taktischen Nuklearwaffenkapazitäten auszubauen und so die Arsenale zu diversifizieren; 3. die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen nuklearen Abschreckung mit Frankreich unter dem Stichwort »Eurodeterrent«; 4. die Laufzeit von Trident abzuwarten und auf eine weitere Generation zu verzichten und 5. die multilaterale Abrüstung aller Nuklearwaffenstaaten voranzutreiben und Trident in solche Verhandlungen zu integrieren.
